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*) 
This is a rejoinder to Per Martin-Lof's (2) reply 
to my comments o~ his paper on the notion of redundancy (1). 
Let me recall what the problem is about. Per Martin-Lof (1) 
has stated (page 4): 11 I regard it as a f~9:~~~~~~ principle that 
the smaller the number f(t(x)) of outcomes is that realize the 
observed value of t(x) , the more does our observation x contra-
dict the hypothesis that the statistic t(x) can be reduced to 
u (x) = u (t(x)) • By fundamental principle, I mean it does not seem 
possible to reduce it to any other more basic or convincing prin-
ciples". This is, of course, a very provocative statement. It 
contradicts the Neyman-Pearson point of view, which many statisti-
cians have considered convincing and fundamental; and it contradicts 
the likelihood idea, which some statisticians consider fundamental. 
Repudiating t~e mainstream of ideas in statistical 
inference theory, Per Martin-tor should have expected a critical. 
appraisal of his method. It would have been natural if he had 
undertaken to do so himself. At least he should have left open the 
possibility of doubt. Yzy examples show that his 
prin-
ciple is not so convincing and they lend support to the now classical 
*) ~his is £~ nm. version (L. a r.~rzviwusls puolished pap~;;l.' uith the 
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ideas in inference theorye All of the methods suggested in my 
examples could have been derived from the general results by Neyman 
and Pearson (extended to the discrete case) in their famous 1933 
papero 
Per Martin-Lof reiterates his idea in a strengthened form in 
his reply, where he states: "I know of no case when one has reject-
ed a statistical hypothesis after having observed the most probable 
value under the hypothesis, and I would not do so myself"o This is 
a rather spectacular statemento Statisticians working with the 
likelihood principle or the Neyman-Pearson ideas have been aware of 
this implication and they have had no misgivings for that reasono 
~am not certain if Martin-Lof's statement is meant to be generalo 
If so, there exists an abundance of examples showing that practical 
statisticians would reject when the most probable event occurso If 
his statement is meant to be subject to his assumptions about uni-
form conditional distribution and confinement to 'relevant' statis-
tics, then Per Martin-Lof should explain why it is !!~!-~:!::~~~£!!~£!~ 
!~-:r;_:~j~~!_!::~~!!_!~~-IE£~!-.E~~~~~!~-~~~!!!_9.~~~!:~-~~-!~~~~-~~~~E!~~!!~ 
are not fulfilled whereas it is unreasonable when they are fulfilledo 
------------------------------------~------~------------------------
In any case my examples sc..:r·v.;; their purpose. 
In my example 1 it is obvious from a practical statistical 
point of view that it is the ~~~~-.!~~!-~!:~-~~~~~!~~~~~~-!~-!~~ 
~~~!~!:_!~~!-~~-~~!!~£~~~~~~ and under the hypothesis there need not 
be any connection between the advantageousness of a hand and the 
probability of its occuranceo In example 4 when testing cr1 = a2 
in the case of two samples from normal populations, we !::~~!~-~~~­
tainly reject if the observations in the first sample are very close 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
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this contradicts Martin-Lof's principle, and rejects 11 a£ter having 
observed the most probable outcome under the hypothesis". 
Statisticians have used the F-test through the last 45 years 
and they have never warned against using it when the num·bers of 
degrees of freedom are small. Thus there certainly has been 
"agreement among statisticians" at least in this case (see Martin-
Lof (2) p. 165). 
In this connection let me also emphasize that statistical 
inference theory has gone a long way since its modern development 
started at the beginning of this century. Milestones have been 
left behind and results of lasting value and immeasurable impor-
tance have been established. Of course they go far beyond con-
firmations of what have been comnwn practice among statisticians. 
The present journal - SJS - has a mission in furthering the right 
understanding of what inference theory stands for today. Of 
course, much needs to be done, but the results obtained should 
constitute a sound foundation for development of new ideas. 
g: __ ~g~-2~£2~E~-~f_E~£~£~~Y~£~~~ 
Martin-Lof's definition of this concept is found on page 4 
and is admittedly a meaningful and interesting concept from a 
statistical point of view. (It really is a condition for ob-
taining a test with 11 Ne;ym.an-structure 11 , according to Lehmann's 
terminology.) However, 
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I do not understand Martin-Lof's (2) remark that "if we consider 
one-sided alternatives pA > P:s , the hypothesis is not reductive 
and hence falls outside of my framework" 0 No111r, perhaps it is not 
necessary to discuss this matter since ~!!_~l-~~~E!~~2_!g~~-~~~ 
~~~-~~~~~~~-:!~£=~~~~~~2 __ ~2~!~-~~-~~~~-~20 However, I am a little 
curiouso It seems to me that in example 3 (fer instance) 
t = (X, Y1 + Y2 ) is sufficient if pA ~ pB , 1i>J'hereas u = X+ Y1+ Y2 
is sufficient if Hence u is a function of t , vJith 
no lliLique inverseo I had no difficulties in interpreting Martin-
Lof's idea about reductiveness in his first papero If t(x) is 
"relevant" (minimal sufficient) a priori an.d u(x) relevant under 
the hypothesis, then u(x) should be a fnnction of t(x) but not 
vice vercao This definition is satisfactor~ in the discrete case 
and could, in a modified form, be made satisfactory in the general 
case (introducing the sigmafields generated by t(x) and u(x) )o 
Therefore, Martin-Lof's remarks about reductiveness in his second 
paper came as a surprise to me o !!~-~~2~!~~L~~E!~!~~l-~~!~~g-~!!l_~ 
~2!~~~~~--~-=-Q __ !~-g~!_E~~~£~~~~-~~~~-!~~!~~-~~~!~~~-~-~-Q--~~~~~-
as it is reductive when tested against e ~ 0. 
---------------------------------------------
It would be of in-
terest to know his explicite definition of reductivenesso 
First, I do certainly ~£! find it contradictary to use a ''one-
sided1' test in a "two-sided" test si tu.ationo After all, it is too 
easy to find examples where such is the caseo I have made no state-
ment which Nartin-Lof could interprete in such a mannero 
The req.irement of "two-sided-ness 11 is hard for me 
to understand. I would like to comment on that even if 
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I may then do tlartin-Lof some injusticeo He may have something 
else in mindo 
First a trivial remarko The normal distribution is character-
ized by the mean ~ and the variance cr 2 o It could just as well 
have been characterized by the second order moment cr2 + ~2 and 
the inverse coefficient of variation ~/cr & :n general any para-
meter characterization 8 could be replaced by a parameter charac-
terization 8 I :::: f( 8) 
and the range of 8 1 • 
if f is one-to-one between the range of e 
Let now 8 = (~ , cr) where ~ is any scalar 
parameter subject to testing, whereas cr is a nuisance parameter 
(which may be many-dimensional or absent altogether). Now if the 
problem is to test ~ = 0 against ~ I 0 it is easy to see that 
We COUld replace 8 = c~ ' cr) by 8 I :::: C1..1 I' cr) Where the problem 
now is one-sided and the relation between 8 and 9' is one-to-one, 
l..l = 0 corresponds to 1-L 1 = 0 and ~ I 0 corresponds to l..l' > 0 o 
Let ~I - __IL_ if 
- 1 + ~ l..l ~ 0 and 
1 l..ll = 1--
~ 
if l..l < 0. Another way 
of proceeding is to let 8 1 = c~·, cr') where ~· = I!..LI and crl = Co,cr), 
o = + 1 or - 1 according as ~ > 0 or < 0 • Then cr 1 = ( o , cr) 
would be the new nuisance parameter and the problem would be to test 
l..l' = 0 against l..l 1 > 0 o Hence, any of Martin-Lof' s own examples 
could be made one-sided (and thus not be reductive?) Vice versa, 
any of my "one-sided" problems could be made two-sided (and hence 
reductive ? ) 
My ow-n use of the words 11 one-sided" and "two-sided" is only descrip-
tive in connection with the special choice of parameters in the 
examples. (In the original version of my paper I did not need those 
expressionso It was the editor and referee who urged me to consider 
"two-sided" situations.) The situation is somewhat different if 
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two-sided-ness is connected with a requirement concerning power 
and ".distance" from hypothesis o However, still it is difficult to 
see the connection with "reductiveness"o 
Of course, in example 4 I could have determined c1 (W) and 
such that 
and, of course, the choice of e: 1 and e: 2 is 
"arbitrary" just as the choice of the level e: itself is "arbitrary"o 
I would not choose e: 1 = 0 (or e: 2 = 0 ) , since it would impair the 
sensitivity (power) relatively to alternatives cr1 < cr2 (or cr1 >cr2 ) 
I would not choose e: = 0 either, since it would impair the sensi-
tivity altogethero 
Since the problem under discussion was an entirely different 
one, I did not want to go into the choice of c1(W) and c2(W) o 
I just followed what has been commonly accepted in textbooks, see 
eogo Anders Hald, page 380 or MeGa Kendall, page 115-1160 From 
a practical point of view the problem is not very importanto However, 
it could be used to illustrate some decision -theoretical aspects. 
Thus in my paper (2) (page and ) I have pointed out that in 
the natural three- decision problem in this situation, 
leads to a test which uniformly maximizes the performance among all 
performance unbiased testso Similar optimum properties could be 
formulated for any choice of and That the distribution 
under the hypothesis lacks symmetry is irrelevanto Thus, to a great 
extent I am willing to go along with Martin-Lof when he says that 
the unbiasedness in power must be rejected in situations with two-
sided alternativeso I have not advocated its useo In the case of 
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one-sided alternatives the principle of power unbiasedness is of 
course very important, and neededo 
My example 4 is treated differently by Martin-Lof and myself .. 
Both treatments are in accordance with Martin-Lof's prescription 
in (1)a Suppose that s2 is the estimate of a2 based on three 
normal observationso Then the difference between his and my treat-
ment is analogous to using S and s2 
s2 
-2 










most "probable" value of S is a I j2 , whereas the most probable 
value of s2 is 0.. In (2) he introduces the assumption that the 
"relevant" statistic should be a "metric", thus excluding s2 o I 
do not see the statistical reasoning behind requiring that the 
relevant statistic shall have the form of a metric like S o 
Of course, the points taken up in sections 3- 5 above are very 
minor points.. The important ideas are discussed in sections 1 and 2 • 
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